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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




LANCE ALLEN JOHNSON, 
 












          NO. 44193 
 
          Kootenai County Case No.  
          CR-2011-14619 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Johnson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation and ordering executed a reduced unified sentence of 10 years, 
with three years fixed? 
 
 
Johnson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 In 2011, the state charged Johnson with money laundering, attempted trafficking 
in marijuana, possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use.  (R., pp.56-58.)  Pursuant to a 
 2 
plea agreement, Johnson pled guilty to money laundering and the state dismissed the 
remaining charges.  (R., p.60.)  On December 16, 2011, the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed 
Johnson on supervised probation for four years with the condition that he serve 180 
days in the county jail.  (R., pp.66-71.)  Johnson was released from the county jail on 
May 14, 2012, and transferred his supervision to North Dakota in September 2012.  (R., 
p.73; PSI, p.31.1)   
Approximately 17 months later, while in North Dakota, Johnson sold a half a 
pound of marijuana to a confidential informant for $2,400.00.  (PSI, p.50.)  Two days 
later, on March 11, 2014, he sold three ounces of marijuana to a confidential informant 
for $1,200.00.  (PSI, p.50.)  On March 17, 2014, Johnson sold one gram of 
methamphetamine to a confidential informant for $250.00.  (PSI, p.50.)  He was 
subsequently charged, in North Dakota, with three counts of felony delivery of a 
controlled substance.  (PSI, p.50.)  On March 20, 2014, Johnson committed (in North 
Dakota) the new crimes of possession of methamphetamine, possession of diazepam, 
possession of hydrocodone, possession of methadone, possession of hash, possession 
of marijuana, and felony possession of drug paraphernalia.  (PSI, pp.47-48.)  
On May 23, 2014, Johnson was convicted, in relation to the above North Dakota 
charges, of five counts of felony possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine, diazepam, hydrocodone, methadone, and hash), one count of  
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
“JOHNSON #44193 PSI.pdf.”   
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misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), one count of felony 
possession of drug paraphernalia, two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver, one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and one 
count of ingesting a controlled substance.  (PSI, pp.31-32, 36-51.)  Johnson received an 
aggregate sentence of five years and was incarcerated in the North Dakota State 
Penitentiary.  (PSI, p.32.)   
Johnson’s probation officer subsequently filed a report of violation in this case, 
alleging that Johnson had violated the conditions of his probation by committing the 
above-listed new crimes.  (PSI, pp.31-33.)  The district court issued a bench warrant on 
July 30, 2014, and Johnson was served with the warrant approximately two years later, 
in March 2016.  (R., pp.74-75.)  On May 2, 2016, Johnson admitted the allegation and 
the district court revoked his probation and ordered executed a reduced unified 
sentence of 10 years, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.78-81.)  Johnson filed a notice of 
appeal timely only from the district court’s order revoking probation.  (R., pp.82-85.)   
Johnson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when, upon revoking 
his probation, it ordered executed a reduced unified sentence of 10 years, with three 
years fixed, rather than imposing the requested “180 days of jail and then [either] 
commuting the sentence” or reinstating him on probation, in light of his claim that “the 
district court could only reasonably conclude from [his] conduct that probation was 
achieving its rehabilitative purpose” because he “seemed to have served a ‘good prison 
term’ in North Dakota,” because North Dakota “would be required to accept [him] if he 
were placed on probation in this case because of his parole status in North Dakota,” 
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and because he “‘has virtually no connection to Idaho.’”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-8 (citing 
Tr., p.18, Ls.20-23).)  Johnson has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.   
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the district court.  
State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992).  When deciding whether to 
revoke probation, the district court must consider “whether the probation [was] achieving 
the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the protection of society.”  Drennen, 
122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701. 
Upon revoking a defendant’s probation, a court may order the original sentence 
executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 35.  State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Beckett, 122 
Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 
783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)).  A court’s decision not to reduce a sentence is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards governing 
whether a sentence is excessive.  Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7.  Those 
standards require an appellant to “establish that, under any reasonable view of the 
facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment.” 
 State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).  Those objectives are: 
“(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing.”  State 
v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978).  The reviewing court “will 
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment,” 
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i.e., “facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation.”  Hanington, 148 Idaho 
at 29, 218 P.3d at 8.    
Contrary to Johnson’s claim on appeal, his abysmal conduct while on probation 
in this case did not demonstrate that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose, 
particularly in light of his continued criminal behavior while in the community.  Johnson 
has an extensive history of criminal offending.  He was convicted of possession of 
marijuana in 2002, at age 18.  (PSI, p.3.)  Less than two years later, he committed the 
new crime of domestic assault with intent to inflict bodily harm, for which he received a 
withheld judgment and was placed on probation for two years, beginning on December 
20, 2004.  (PSI, p.3.)  Johnson violated his probation five months later.  (PSI, p.3.)  Six 
months after that, he was charged with the new crime of felony possession of a 
controlled substance.  (PSI, pp.4-5.)  He was later convicted of a reduced charge of 
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, for which he was placed on probation for five 
years, and he was also found in violation of his probation in the domestic assault case, 
for which he was required to serve 54 days of jail time.  (PSI, pp.4-5.)  Just nine weeks 
later, on June 17, 2006, Johnson committed the new crime of felony possession of a 
controlled substance (“not small” amount of marijuana) and was sentenced to prison; 
however, his sentence was suspended for 10 years and he was again placed on 
probation.  (PSI, pp.4-5.)  He also incurred a third probation violation as a result of the 
new felony charge.  (PSI, pp.4-5.)   
Johnson was discharged from probation on December 8, 2008, and, 
approximately eight months later, he began transporting cash and drugs between 
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Minnesota and Oregon “on average twice per month.”  (PSI, pp.5, 21.)  He continued to 
make these bimonthly trips “to purchase drugs” over the next “1.5 to 2 years,” until 
August 11, 2011, when he was stopped for speeding and swerving across the center 
line while driving through Idaho, on his way to Oregon.  (PSI, pp.2, 17, 20-21.)  Johnson 
admitted that he “was under the influence of drugs or alcohol” at the time.  (PSI, p.3.)  
He gave officers permission to search his vehicle and, upon conducting the search, 
officers found marijuana, methamphetamine, several methamphetamine and marijuana 
pipes, “multiple unknown green pills” that Johnson reported were “Oxycontin,” and a 
total of $45,782.00 in cash, most of which was “wrapped with rubber bands, in what 
appeared to be $1000 stacks,” inside vacuum-sealed bags.  (PSI, pp.18-20.)  Johnson 
told officers that the purpose of his trip was to drive to Oregon to “deliver a bag of 
money in exchange for drugs and then bring the drugs back to” his home state of 
Minnesota, where he “personally sells around 2 ounces of marijuana a week.”  (PSI, 
p.21.)    
The state charged Johnson (in this case) with money laundering, attempted 
trafficking in marijuana, possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use; Johnson pled guilty only to the 
money laundering charge, in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges.  (R., 
pp.56-58, 60.)  The presentence investigator concluded that Johnson “has not learned 
from his past mistakes,” and that, due to the seriousness of Johnson’s actions in the 
instant offense, the harm such conduct does to communities, and “his history of 
probation violations, absconding, and failure to complete court-ordered programming 
within the community, it is highly unlikely that [Johnson] would do well if he is once 
 7 
again placed on probation and allowed to interstate to Minnesota.”  (PSI, p.12.)  Despite 
this, the district court granted Johnson yet another opportunity to successfully complete 
a period of supervised probation.  (R., pp.66-71.)   
Rather than taking advantage of the opportunity, Johnson chose instead to 
resume his criminal behavior while on probation, committing – and subsequently being 
convicted of – nine new felonies and two new misdemeanor crimes in North Dakota, all 
of which were drug-related, and at least three of which involved Johnson selling illegal 
drugs.  (PSI, pp.31-32, 36-51.)  Johnson received an aggregate sentence of five years 
and was incarcerated in the North Dakota State Penitentiary for approximately two 
years before he was paroled and returned to Idaho to answer for the resulting probation 
violation in this case.  (PSI, p.32; Tr., p.15, Ls.5-6; R., pp.75-76.)  Johnson’s probation 
officer recommended that the district court revoke Johnson’s probation and order 
executed the original unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, stating: 
As can be seen from the defendant's continued disregard [sic] to 
obey the laws of society, as well as the terms and conditions of probation, 
it appears he does not appreciate the opportunity of probation awarded to 
him, nor has he shown he is ready to be a productive member of society.  
Furthermore, the defendant's continued criminal/anti-social behavior 
seems to indicate he may lack the tools needed to be a productive 
member of society, and, therefore, may not be an appropriate candidate 
for community supervision.  It is the opinion of this officer that the 
defendant is in need of a greater level of supervision and treatment at this 
time and would benefit from a more structured environment, free from any 
outside distractions or temptations.  
 
(PSI, p.32.)   
 At the disposition hearing for Johnson’s probation violation, the district court 
concluded:   
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Well, apparently the consequences didn’t change the behavior 
because you go back to selling drugs again in North Dakota.  So knowing 




I disagree with the plea agreement today.  I don’t think reinstating 
you on probation is the appropriate sentence.  I certainly don’t think 
commuting it is the appropriate sentence.  I think the protection of society 
is the foremost factor for the Court to consider today.  I’m not satisfied that 
the community, not just Idaho, but whatever community you’re involved in 
is adequately protected with reinstatement on probation. 
 
I don’t think reinstatement on probation serves as a deterrence [sic] 
to anybody else in a similar situation as you.  I don’t think it adequately 
addresses the punishment that society expects. 
 
And, therefore, I am revoking your probation.   
 
(Tr., p.21, L.21 – p.22, L.23.)  The district court considered the fact that Johnson had 
served approximately two years in a North Dakota prison for the nine new felonies he 
committed in North Dakota while on probation in this case, and showed leniency by 
reducing the fixed portion of Johnson’s sentence in this case by two years.  (Tr., p.22, 
L.24 – p.23, L.2.)  Johnson has failed to show that he was entitled to further leniency, 
and he is clearly no longer a viable candidate for community supervision, given the fact 
that he committed nine new felonies and two new misdemeanors during the less than 
two-year period (May 2012 through March 2014) that he was actually in the community 
while on probation in this case.  (R., pp.66-71, 73-76; PSI, pp.31-32, 36-51; Tr., p.15, 
Ls.5-6.)  That Johnson “seemed to have served a ‘good prison term’ in North Dakota” 
(Appellant’s brief, p.6 (emphasis added)) for the numerous new felony crimes he 
committed in that state does not indicate that he would perform well while out of 
custody; in fact, his ongoing criminal offending and unwillingness to abide by the terms 
of community supervision suggest precisely the opposite.   
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Johnson’s escalating pattern of criminal offending, particularly over such a short 
period of time, does not, in any way, demonstrate that probation was achieving its 
rehabilitative purpose.  To the contrary, Johnson’s abject refusal to abide by the law or 
the terms of community supervision demonstrate his complete failure to rehabilitate and 
his continued danger to society.  The district court was correct to decline to commute 
Johnson’s sentence or to reinstate him on probation.  Given any reasonable view of the 
facts, Johnson has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion when it 
revoked his probation and ordered executed a reduced unified sentence of 10 years, 
with three years fixed.   
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
revoking Johnson’s probation and executing a reduced unified sentence of 10 years, 
with three years fixed. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of November, 2016, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
BEN P. MCGREEVY  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming __________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
 
